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INTRODUCTION
Tension among states, a common situation in international politics, sometimes escalates to the level of crisis. These periods of crisis are characterized by uncertainty; some are the prelude to a war, while others are resolved peacefully. Political science theory reflects this uncertainty, especially in the case of the most common type of crisis, brinkmanship, where one state's decision-makers challenge the commitment of another state in order to advance their interests, even at the risk of war.
According to
Lebow, "The fundamental assumption about brinkmanship is that initiators expect their adversaries to back away from their commitments when faced with the prospect of war". This paper presents a different explanation. It argues that a major cause of war in a brinkmanship crisis is not the misperception of the adversary's response, but rather an objective situation where leaders are compelled to act because of threats to their power.
The study of two recent brinkmanship crises--the Beagle and the Malvinas--will illustrate this explanation. During its most recent authoritarian regime (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) , Argentina experienced two brinkmanship crises. In 1977-78, the country came to the edge of an armed conflict against its neighbor, Chile. The reason for this crisis was the rejection 3 by Argentina of the decision of an international court to award to Chile three islands in the southern part of the country. Both countries had not been so close to war since the beginning of the century. The second crisis was Argentina's 1982 war against Great Britain over the Malvinas Islands. In this case the outcome of Argentina's policy was a complete failure, and the price Argentina paid was heavy.
Why did Argentina avoid war against Chile, yet fight against Great Britain? The paper will examine, first, Lebow's influential analysis of brinkmanship's theoretical foundation. I will then study the two cases of brinkmanship, the Beagle and Malvinas crises, in light of a new interpretation. The conclusion will show the shortcomings of the brinkmanship approach when it is limited to cognitive considerations and ignores strategic thinking.
BRINKMANSHIP CRISES: MANIPULATING THE RISKS OF WAR
Although Lebow notes that "there is no accepted definition of international crisis", 4 most attempts at definition have some elements in common. Among these elements are the perception of threat, heightened anxieties on the part of decision-makers, the expectation of possible violence, and the belief that important or far-reaching decisions are required and must be made on the basis of incomplete information in a stressful environment. 5 One type of crisis known as brinkmanship occurs "when a state knowingly challenges an important commitment of another state in the hope of compelling its adversary to back away from his commitment". According to Lebow, a brinkmanship challenge is associated to two preconditions: "(1) the existence of serious domestic and international threats that a successful challenge of an adversary's commitment promises to overcome, and (2) perception by the initiator that a vulnerable commitment exists," that is, that the adversary is likely to back away form his commitment. 7 The defining characteristic of Lebow's brinkmanship crisis is the expectation that the adversary will retreat rather than fight: "our fundamental assumption about brinkmanship is that initiators expect their adversaries to back away from their commitments when faced with the prospect of war". 8 Although "more often than not that perception is wrong," the outcome of brinkmanship crises is not predetermined.
9
"The actual management of the crisis [is] allimportant in determining whether or not it is resolved." According to Lebow, "successful mastery of brinkmanship crises...requires that policy reflects a rapid and ongoing learning process in order to expose erroneous perceptions and promote policy more in tune with the existing political realities". 10 Lebow argues that the outcome of a brinkmanship crisis depends on the answer to two questions: One, how wrong is the initiator in estimating the adversary's resolve? And, two, how much time does the initiator require to recognize his miscalculation and change his policy?
11
Thus it is "imperative for initiators to remain sensitive to cues from their environment about the validity of their expectations." His study of several cases leads him to conclude, "when initiators recognized and corrected for initial misjudgments, they usually succeeded in averting war".
12
He is not very optimistic about the ability of policymakers to improve their managerial skills during crises, however, for "it is unrealistic to 5 think that leaders can be prevailed upon to make their decision-making processes more open, given the threat this can pose to both their power and policy preferences."
13
The following study of the brinkmanship crises of Beagle and Malvinas will show that domestic political considerations, especially the survival of a regime, are also critical to the decision to initiate a brinkmanship challenge. If, as in the Beagle crisis, policymakers have room to maneuver vis-a-vis domestic social forces, the outcome of the crisis is more uncertain and the actions of external actors become important. Conversely, in the Malvinas case, the military was compelled by domestic political concerns to engage in a brinkmanship challenge regardless its evaluation of the expected behavior of Great Britain or the United States.
THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CRISIS
In July, 1971, after nearly a century of controversy, the Argentine military government agreed with Chile to have Great Britain arbitrate the Beagle Channel dispute in order to avoid a major conflict in the southernmost part of a shared border of more than 3,000 miles. Chile occupied the three principal islands of the area: Picton, Lennox, and Nueva, and the Hornos Island, as well. According to the terms of the agreement, the British government was restricted to accepting or rejecting the decision of an international court of five jurists.
14 In May 1977, Great Britain informed the Argentine government of its decision.
The arbitration award confirmed the possession by Chile of the islands and (according to 6 international law) the adjacent sea area. Because the award was considered a threat to what her strategists considered the vital interests of the nation, the Argentine government decided to reject the award and tried to resume bilateral negotiations with Chile.
15
When it became clear that the Chileans wanted full acceptance of the resolution, the Argentine position hardened, and Argentina began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory. Chile's position was that the award was legitimate and all islands, from the Beagle Channel south, belonged to it. Chile agreed to participate in negotiations only over the legal consequences of the award, especially over some controversial issues such as the demarcation of sea limits.
16
During the Beagle crisis, Argentine policymakers were divided into two groups, hardliners and softliners.
17
The conflict between Argentina and Chile for the Beagle Channel follows Lebow's description of a brinkmanship crisis originated by an intraelite competition for power: "historically this has often happened when the competition for influence within the policy-making elite reflects a broader social-political struggle." When this occurs, "foreign policy issues may be assessed in terms of how they affect the balance of power between or among the competing factions."
18
Given the Chilean refusal to enter into new negotiations, the hardliners, pressured for drastic military actions. The softliners, on the contrary, wanted to avoid war and struggled to maintain bilateral negotiations.
On May 31, 1977, after Great Britain's decision in favor of Chile became public, a special commission of Argentine political leaders presented to Argentine President Jorge Videla a demarcation proposal to offer to Chile.
19
The proposal followed what could be 7 considered a moderate line. It was favored by the President, but was rejected by the ruling military Junta. This body was especially influenced by a hardliner, General Osiris Villegas, a well known specialist on geopolitics who acted as the Junta's advisor. Given the Junta's opposition, the proposal of the commission was set aside. The government argued that Great Britain's award contained errors and contradictions.
The government's decision, which was adopted with the agreement of the three military services, caused a strongly negative Chilean reaction and brought the two nations to a confrontation. Armed forces were mobilized and an arms race followed. There was a real possibility of open warfare.
24
Frenzied diplomatic activity occurred alongside the military preparations. In 1977, three missions crossed the Andes in order to negotiate, and there was also a meeting of foreign ministers.
25
In 1978, the diplomatic agenda of both countries were equally crowded, with two presidential summits, one in the Argentine city of Mendoza (January 19, 1978) and the second in the Chilean city of Puerto Montt (February 20, 1978) . There was also one personal envoy from President Pinochet to President Videla, three more special missions, two rounds of meetings of joint commissions (which were created after 8 the presidential summit in Puerto Montt), one meeting of secretaries of the armed forces of both countries, one exchange of notes between Presidents Videla and Pinochet, and between foreign ministers as well.
26
All this diplomatic activity was fruitless, and the crisis continued. Argentina began to exert economic pressure upon Chile. A number of Chilean citizens were expelled, reservists were called up, and blackout drills were conducted in various cities, including Buenos Aires.
27
The peak of the tension was reached between October and December It was formed by the president, the three members of the Junta, and the secretaries of the three armed forces. The Comité Militar accepted mediation under the conditions that both countries define precisely their differences and both agree to establish some criteria to be used to reach a pacific solution.
38
The two foreign ministers agreed to meet on December 12 in Buenos Aires.
Informally, they had agreed to mediation; now in the meeting they had to decide, formally, who would be asked to mediate? The crisis escalated. Argentina announced that due to Chile's intransigence, the country had decided to use force.
42
After the failure of the foreign ministers' meeting, the Comité Militar began to operate permanently in the air force command building. The hardliners assumed charge of the situation; President Videla and the foreign minister were not invited to the Comité meetings. The commander in chief of the army, General Viola, pressed for fixing a date to proceed with military action. His position was based on strong pressures from within the army (on December 14, during a tumultuous meeting, the high command of the army pressured General Viola to commit to military action). Under this pressure, Viola participated later in the meetings of the Comité Militar, although there is evidence that his personal position was conciliatory. 43 During the meeting, it is said, he first tried to gain time while saying that Argentina would have to wait for the United States "to develop its strategy" (sic), but he was overcome by the hardliners. The newspaper Clarín explained some years later that such caution was based, in part, on military concerns. In order to achieve a victory, certain objectives had to be reached before the seventh day after the attack. Some military leaders considered this not enough time due to the difficulty involved in transportation through the passes over the Andean Mountains. 46 Despite these concerns, the Comité decided on armed action, and on December 14, President Videla explained to Papal Nuncio Pío Laghi that he had given orders to invade the islands on either the 21st or 22nd of December. He had little choice; otherwise he would have been removed. 47 The issue was rapidly heading toward a military confrontation.
On December 19, Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos again sent a note to the Argentine government proposing Vatican mediation. Again, the Argentine government rejected it because the proposal did not satisfy Argentina's minimal expectations. The disagreement about the scope of the mediation continued, and Argentina sent a naval squadron to the area in conflict and Chile did the same. 48 Luckily, due to bad weather the two naval squadrons never met. 49 Meanwhile, the Pope, alarmed by the situation, decided to act personally and informed both governments that he was sending his personal envoy to both capitals.
50
Six hours before the fixed hour for the initiation of hostilities on December 22, the military operation (Operation Soberanía) was called off. The Pope's offer of "good offices" had the effect of suddenly changing the conditions of the internal struggle within the Comité 13 Militar. Specifically, the Pope's announcement made the middleliners change their position to the acceptance of mediation and immediate cease of military operation. 51 The appearance of the Pope had been effective, and the hardliners within the Argentine government had to back down. 52 The role of third parties helped considerably to resolve the dispute between Chile and Argentina. Vatican diplomacy was decisive in avoiding the military confrontation because it combined significant moral influence over the parties with a subtle yet firm and pragmatic diplomacy aimed at bringing both parties closer together. 53 Moreover, the Pope was not alone in his concerns. As the tension increased, the international community expressed alarm.
54
The activity of the American and Vatican ambassadors in both countries was significant, with both urging a negotiated solution. 55 The decision of the Pope to send his personal delegate gave President Videla and his government a diplomatic exit from its hardline course.
The role of the United States in this crisis should also be highlighted. In addition to the actions of the American ambassadors in Chile and Argentina, the decisions taken by President Carter were important. The United States made it absolutely clear to Argentina that any military action would not be accepted. 56 However, the U.S. government understood the influence of the Vatican; accordingly, United States diplomacy focused upon encouraging the Pope's intervention. 57 On January 8, 1979, the presidents of Argentina and Chile met in Montevideo, where in the presence of the Vatican envoy they signed a non-aggression pact and agreed to a compromise that returned the military situation to that of 1977. Moreover, Argentines also miscalculated the United States' reaction to the overtake. They were confident that the country would acknowledge the Argentine action, or at least remain neutral. 60 Clearly, "Argentina's leaders ... had no desire to provoke a war with Great Britain," but their error was that "like many initiators of brinkmanship crises, they miscalculated their adversary's response, an error that resulted in war."
61
Other scholars agree with this argument, stating that the misperception had several pernicious effects, the most important of which was that Argentine planning was only for a short occupation and not for war. 62 It is generally argued that both this misperception and the clear military inferiority of the Argentine forces produced the military defeat and the consequent breakdown of Argentina's military regime.
63
It follows from this argument that had the Argentines understood the British resolve to defend the islands, they would have restrained themselves from proceeding with military action. But, according to Lebow, the Junta's miscalculations "were rationalizations for a policy to which the generals were committed." Once the decision was taken, the military rationalized the probability of success, which in turn produced their cognitive closure.
67
The dynamic of decision-making was of the groupthink type. 68 The Malvinas crisis ended in war not because of the initiators' misperceptions about Great Britain's resolve, but, rather, because of the decision of the Junta to risk a "regime-rescue" operation through brinkmanship. Once committed, the Argentine military could not back down. 69 According to Lebow, Argentine policy toward the Malvinas was decisively influenced by domestic concerns. The Junta's motivation was based on "the need to do something to restore its faltering legitimacy". 70 Levy and Vakili have demonstrated that the military regime aimed to use foreign policy as a diversionary action in order to improve its domestic political support. Their argument is that authoritarian regimes "faced with a narrowing base of public support, and economic crisis ... often perceive a third option-diversionary behavior. If the target is carefully selected, diversionary actions can work both to unify the regime internally around a new mission and to increase its domestic political support (or at least to buy some additional time) through appeals to 16 patriotic symbols of nationalism." 71 Beginning around 1980, the failure of the economic program and the successful completion of the suppression of terrorism left the military regime without a shared sense of mission and with serious disagreements over economic and social policy and how best to secure the institutional interests of the military. The regime had significant divisions, which facilitated the formation of a domestic civilian opposition. 72 Pressures for a political opening increased. 73 In the absence of viable alternatives, internal bargaining within the military regime led to the decision to invade the Malvinas as a means of reestablishing the corporate unity of the military around the Malvinas issue and at the same time establishing the regime's legitimacy with society. 74 Freedman and GambaStonehouse assess the situation of the regime in the following terms: "There were powerful domestic and international reasons for action. The Junta's inheritance was uncomfortable. Its predecessors had made themselves unpopular through severe political repression combined with the steady deterioration of the economy ... The [Malvinas] issue was coming to be seen as central to Argentina's future position in the South Atlantic, as well as being the only major foreign policy issue upon which it could act in 1982." 75 Since 1833, Argentina and Great Britain had been negotiating over the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands. During the 1960s and 1970s some very slow progress was made, but negotiations ended in a deadlock at the end of the 1970s. In March 1981 Argentina's new president, Roberto Viola, was "elected" by the Junta to serve for a period of 3 years.
The ensuing months were marked by continuous struggle between the Executive and the Junta. General Viola intended to liberalize the regime, but important sectors of the military were strongly opposed to such a move.
76
The situation did not last long. In December 1981, Viola was removed and General Leopoldo Galtieri became the new president and also the commander of the army. With Galtieri serving as both president and commander-in-chief of the army, the structure of power was altered, violating the 1978 agreement among the Junta members which required the commander-in-chief of the army to retire from military duty in order to serve as president. However, the price for agreeing to this change by the navy was the approval by the army of a military operation against the Malvinas.
77
In January 1982, President Galtieri began to focus on the country's foreign policy.
The president paid much attention in the appointment of a new foreign minister. He selected Nicanor Costa Mendez, a person with experience with the Malvinas as foreign minister of a past military regime. He was considered a hardliner by the Junta. 78 In order to improve its image and position, domestic and internationally, the government mounted a new diplomatic campaign over the Beagle Channel, and in February it gave hints of pending military involvement in Central America to earn U.S.
support. This was soon followed by a diplomatic offensive against Great Britain. In this offensive, Galtieri demanded an acknowledgement of Argentina's sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. The Malvinas issue was promising in terms of public support, and it gained increasing primacy on the Junta's diplomatic agenda. The decision to focus on the I understand from your words, Mr. President [Galtieri] , that Argentina reserves the right to use force. I want to make clear that the relationship between your country and mine will suffer gravely. American and worldwide public opinion will take a negative attitude to an Argentine use of force. Besides, the effort I have made to restore our relationship will be severely affected. Great Britain, Mr. President, is a very close friend of the United States and one will see the new relationship that Washington has with Argentina-achieved in full view of American public opinion and after a long effort-irremediably prejudiced.
102
The United States's intervention in this case is strongly criticized by American and British scholars.
103
One of the reasons for the failure of the United States to restrain Argentina is attributed to the relationship established between the Reagan administration and the Argentine military. After Feldman traces the path of negotiations which involved the United States, he concludes that not only was the U.S. unable to deter Argentina from its attempt to regain the Malvinas, or able to persuade them to accept compromise solutions to the conflict, but the very efforts used by the Reagan administration to enlist Argentine support for U.S. hemispheric security efforts actually enhanced chances for war by nurturing in Argentina an exaggerated sense of its own strategic importance.
104
The Argentine government seriously misperceived that the United States government 23 would support Argentina, or at least, remain neutral.
105
But on three different occasions, the United States sent clear messages to the Argentine government. What is clearer than a personal phone call from the president, himself, to General Galtieri? The question is why did the messages fail to achieve their purpose? One explanation is that if the occupation was a symbolic gesture to force Britain to negotiate seriously, then the opposition of the United States to a military action was not going to have any effect on the Argentine actions.
106
The Argentine government had no incentive to oppose the decision to invade. It has to be remembered that the political support to Galtieri depended upon the operation.
Moreover, the existence of the entire regime was believed to rest on the recovery of the islands. Under such circumstances, it is improbable that President Galtieri would have opened a door to a process of negotiation that would constitute backing away from the islands. The navy, and specially Admiral Anaya, were eager to go on with the operation because of the gains expected from its success. The result was a unified coalition to carry on the military operations. This situation contrasts sharply with the governmental factionalism during the Beagle crisis, where both the Argentine president and the foreign minister after Montes's removal favored a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and where some members of the Junta were dubious about the wisdom of conducting military operations against Chile.
In the end, the tragedy was that "the generals were caught between the military facts, which dictated a settlement, and the political facts at home, which indicated that...their tenure as Argentina's leaders was unlikely to survive any settlement they had 24 any chance of reaching." Conversely, in the Beagle crisis the outcome was more difficult to predict, given the struggle between factions. On that occasion, the Pope's intervention was an external factor that helped to shift the balance in favor of the antiwar faction. Unlike the Malvinas crisis, in the Beagle crisis the military could back down without losing face or confronting 26 their dismissal from power. In this case, where the confrontation was intraelite, the regime had room for a diplomatic retreat.
In short, when an adversary is resolved to defend his commitment, and when the domestic conditions that the initiators confront are critical for their survival, it is possible to predict the outcome of a brinkmanship crisis. In those cases the outcome is war. Lebow 1981, 9 . He proposes a definition of international crisis in terms of three aspects of perception: (1) policy-makers perceive that the action or threatened action of another international actor seriously impairs concrete national interests, the country's bargaining reputation, or their own ability to remain in power; (2) policy-makers perceive that any actions on their part designed to counter this threat will raise a significant prospect of war; and (3) policy-makers perceive themselves to be acting under time constraints (1981, (10) (11) (12) . 6 Lebow 1981, 57. He identifies two other types of crises: justification of hostility and spin-off. The latter occurs when extraordinary actions on the part of the belligerent, designed to advance the initiators' interests, provoke confrontations with third parties (1981, 41) . In the former, the leaders of the initiating nation have made a decision for war before the crisis commences (Lebow 1981, 25 The Argentine foreign minister at that time expressed the idea "...no commitment obliges a country to comply with that which affects its vital interests or that which damages rights of sovereignty" (Princen 105) . The award was perceived as especially threatening the so-called bi-oceanic principle which maintained that Argentina has to control the Atlantic waters while Chile the Pacific. Further, "although the size of the islands...averages only slightly more than 40 square miles, possession of the islands establishes control over an additional 30,000 square maritime miles, if one assumes the 200-mile limit." Argentina was also concerned about control of Patagonia, the southern part of the country, where large numbers of Chileans had settled. Argentines have always been sensitive to Chilean presence in the area. Another reason for the intransigence of the parties involved competing claims in Antarctica (Garret 82). Finally, reinforcing these objections was the idea that Argentina interpreted the award as a symbol of the continuing territorial amputation that, according to Argentine history textbooks, the country has suffered since its independence in 1816 (Escudé 1990) . 16 Russell 1990, 38. 17 T ypically, hardliners advocate firmness in crises, and they are wary of accommodative moves, fearing that will be interpreted as weakness. Conversely, softliners are typically more fearful that events will get out of control. They advocate a more accommodative policy. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977) 298-309. 18 For instance, intraelite competition was a primary cause of the brinkmanship crises of Fashoda (1898), Korea (1903 Korea ( -1904 , and the Sino-Indian (1962) (Lebow 1981, 71) . 19 The commission operated in the Foreign Ministry and was composed of representatives of the three branches of the armed forces, ministries of economy and foreign relations, joint chiefs of staff, and the secretary of public information (Russell 37 Later, in mid-November, two more members were added, both from the army's staff. 32 Russell 46. For example, the army corps commanders had a strong gravitation in power schema of the military regime. The corp commanders were responsible for a military zone (which averaged five or four provinces) in the framework of the antisubversive struggle. They also exerted "de facto power over the judiciary, as well as influence [d] 39 Princen 115. 40 Princen 117. 41 Russell 50. In this regard, the Chilean minister commented: "I have the feeling that I am not talking with the owner of the circus" ( Somos 1984, 31) . 42 Russell 49.The Argentine military operation was code named "Operation Sovereignty." The date for the assault was fixed for December 21 or 22. The military planned to occupy two islands (Nueva and Hornos), wait for the Chilean reaction and then reply. (Russell 50) In this way the plan resembled that of the Malvinas invasion in 1982 (Operation Blue). For a more detailed explanation about the Argentine military planning see Somos March 4, 1987 , 28-29. 43 Somos 1984 According to Somos , Viola later confessed his duality: "I am a `hard' in the Junta and a `soft' in the Army. I always lose" (1984, 31; my translation) . 45 Russell 50.
46
There is another explanation. According to Clarín , two consequences were feared. First, those who were dubious feared a possible regionalization of the conflict. Second, as a consequence, the conflict could acquire
